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Managing Conflict of Interest in
Service Composition
Haiyang Sun, Weiliang Zhao, and Jian Yang
Department of Computing, Macquarie University,
Sydney, NSW2109, Australia
{hsun,wzhao,jian}@ics.mq.edu.au
Abstract. Web services can be composed of other services in a highly
dynamic manner. The existing role based authorization approaches have
not adequately taken component services into account when managing
access control for composite services. In this paper, we propose a service
oriented conceptual model as an extension of role based access control
that can facilitate the administration and management of access for ser-
vice consumers as well as component services in composite web services.
Various types of conflict of interest are identified due to the complicated
relationships among service consumers and component services. A set of
authorization rules are developed to prevent the conflict of interest. This
research is a step forward to addressing the challenge in authorization in
the context of composite web services.
Keywords: Authorization, Conflict of Interest, Composite Web Services.
1 Introduction
The nature of web service creates the opportunity for building composite services
by combining existing elementary or complex services (referred to as component
services) [1]. Authorization of composite web services is different from traditional
authorization in a close system due to the dynamic and complex relationships
among service consumers and component services. Let us look at an example of
Tom & Brothers which is a vehicle parts dealer that provides vehicle engines and
engine accessories for both military and civil use. An Order Service is set up in
Tom & Brothers including five operations: (1) Order Engine, (2) Order Engine
Accessory, (3) Payment, (4) Payment Verification and (5) Logistics (See Fig. 1).
Note, the Logistics operation is not available to the military customers since
they organize parts shipment by themselves. When receiving a part order from a
customer, the Tom & Brothers will order the parts from various parts suppliers.
As soon as the payment has been verified, the goods will be transported to the
customer. We observe that the following features exist in Order Service in Tom
& Brothers that make authorization of composite web services complicated:
– Complicated Authorization Constraints: The component services of
a composite web service may belong to different organizations, come from
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Fig. 1. Order Service in Tom & Brothers
different security domains, and have different security and interest require-
ments. The authorization constraints of a composite web service can be very
complicated. For example, in Fig. 1, the operation (1)-Order Engine can be
supported by the component web services A, B and C. Therefore before au-
thorization is granted to a service consumer for the Order Engine operation,
the policies of component web services A, B and C need to be checked. The
complicated authorization constrains of composite services change the basic
authorization question ”who can do what?” to a more complicated one as
”who can do what under what conditions”.
– Dynamicity of Component Services: There may be several web services
that can provide the same or similar operations. The specifications and poli-
cies of individual component services can change frequently. For example,
if a component service changes its authorization policy from asking Tom &
Brothers for professional engineer certificate to requiring sales representa-
tive qualification, then all the service operations in Tom & Brothers that
are supported by the component service need to update their authorization
policies accordingly. In Fig. 1, component services A, B, and N can support
the same type of engine accessories to Tom & Brothers. If the changes occur
frequently or happen in many web services, an efficient way to manage these
changes is needed.
– Conflict of Interest: Authorization in composite services must prevent
conflicts of interest among service consumers, among component services,
and between consumers and component services. When there is a conflict
of interest between a specific service consumer and a specific component
service, the Order Service in Tom & Brothers should not be authorized to
the service consumer when this component service is essentially needed in the
composite service. For example, USA military customers may have a conflict
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of interest with a component web service from a Chinese part supplier. The
existing role based access control employs the mechanism of separation of
duty to deal with conflict of interest for consumers, which is inadequate in
dealing with the complicated situations occurred in the service setting.
In Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [2], users acquire permissions through
their roles rather than that they are assigned permissions directly. This greatly
reduces the administrative overhead associated with individual users and permis-
sions. All existing role-based models in web service paradigm have not brought
the administration of component services into the picture. The component ser-
vices are normally remote resources or related with remote resources (the term
resource will be used instead of component service later in the paper). The quan-
tity of resources can be very large and they can be prone-to-change, which must
be considered in web service authorization. In research work [8, 10, 11], roles
are assigned to service consumers for service authorization. However all these
researches have not put resources into the picture or they simply employ an un-
realistic assumption that there is a global coordination on internal authorization
policies of each autonomous web services to enforce the access control in service
composition. Furthermore, resources in composite web services can introduce
new types of conflict of interest on top of the conflict of interest between service
consumers defined in the traditional RBAC approaches. The conflict of inter-
est can occur among service consumers, among resources, and between service
consumers and resources.
In this paper we propose a general approach for the authorization of com-
posite web services as an extension of role based access control, which grants
authorization to a service consumer based on the authorization constraints of
the composite web services as well as those of the resources. Based on the pre-
viously proposed Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) in [4], four
types of conflict of interest are identified regarding to both service consumers
and resources invoked in composite web services. The authorization rules are
devised for these identified types of conflict of interest. Comparing with existing
work, our proposed approach has the following merits:
• The characteristics and requirements for both service consumers and re-
sources in composite web services can be explicitly captured.
• The proposed approach provides an efficient way to administrate and man-
age large number of service consumers and dynamic resources in relation to
authorization in composite web services.
• The proposed approach has the capability to detect the conflict of interest
among service consumers, among resources, and between service consumers
and resources that are far more complicated than the ones identified in the
existing role based authorization approaches for web services.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual
model for the service oriented authorization. Section 3 identifies the various
types of conflict of interest and provides the rules to prevent the conflict of
interest in authorization of composite web services. Section 4 overviews some
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related work. Concluding remarks and discussion of future work are presented
in Section 5.
2 Conceptual Model of Service Oriented Authorization
Control
In this section, we describe a conceptual model, named as Service Oriented
Authorization Control (SOAC) for managing the authorization of composite web
service. SOAC is divided into two parts, service provision and service realization
(See Fig. 2). We express the SOAC conceptual model by using the notation of
Entity-Relationship (E-R) Diagram. In Fig. 2, rectangles represent elements
and diamonds represent relationships.
Fig. 2. Service Oriented Authorization Control (SOAC) Conceptual Model
2.1 Service Provision Specification
In service provision, a service consumer can get the authorization by fulfilling
constraints of the composite service (See Constraint enacted between the ele-
ments of Role (R) and Service Consumer (SC) in Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, we define
service consumer as the element that requires to access the composite web ser-
vice’s operations (Op). Since service consumers are prone to change and the
quantity of consumers can be vary large, directly specifying the assignment of
operations to individual service consumers needs tedious administration efforts.
In SOAC, we follow the philosophy of RBAC to have concept role to encapsulate
the service consumers that can satisfy the common authorization constraints of
composite web services. A role will be assigned to a service consumer based on
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its characteristics (typically a credential that service consumer submits to the
composite web service). Each role binds with a group of operations that can be
accessed. The roles guarantee that the composite web service’s operations can
only be accessed by the qualified service consumers. The mapping between ser-
vice consumers and roles are considered in the service provision part of SOAC
with the following formal specification.
Definition 1. The service provision in SOAC includes:
– SC, R ,and Op are elements representing Service Consumer, Role, and
Operation.
– SCA ⊆ SC × R, a many-to-many relation to map service consumer to
role assignment. Formally, ∀sc∈SC, ∀r∈R, (sc, r)∈SCA ⇒ sc.credential =
r.credential, where the credential that the service consumer submits is con-
sistent with the credential that the role requires.
– assigned sc:(r:R) → 2SC, the mapping of role r onto a set of service
consumers. Formally, assigned sc(r)={sc∈SC|(sc, r)∈SCA}.
– OPA ⊆Op×R, a many-to-many relation to map operation to role
assignment.
– assigned op:(r:R) → 2Op, the mapping of role r onto a set of operations.
Formally, assigned op(r)={op∈Op | (op, r) ∈OPA}.
2.2 Service Realization Specification
Due to the feature of Dynamicity of resources, it is unrealistic to specify the
relationships between resources and the supported operations of composite web
services individually. Resource type is defined for a set of resources by identify-
ing their characteristics and authorization constraints (See Fig.2). The composite
web service can bear multiple resource types that cover many resources. The re-
sources can be accessed to support the operation if the operation is mapped with
a resource type that covers these resources. Resources are linked with resource
types with constraints. (See Constraint between the elements of Resource Type
(ReT) and Resources (Re) in Fig. 2). The mapping between resources and re-
source types is the major concern in service realization part of SOAC. The formal
specification of service realization is presented here.
Definition 2. The service realization in SOAC includes:
– Op, ReT, and Re are elements representing Operation, Resource Type, and
Resource.
– SPA ⊆ Op × ReT, a many-to-many relation to map operation to resource
type.
– assigned ret:(ret:ReT) → 2Op, the mapping of resource type ret onto a
set of operations. Formally, assigned ret(ret)={op∈Op|(op, ret)∈SPA}.
– RTA ⊆Re×ReT, a many-to-many relation to map resource to resource
type. Formally, ∀re∈Re, ∀ret∈ReT, (re, ret)∈RTA ⇒ re.constraint = ret.
constraint, where the constraint that restricts the access on the resource is
consistent with the constraint that the resource type can fulfill.
278 H. Sun, W. Zhao, and J. Yang
– assigned re:(ret:ReT) → 2Re, the mapping of resource type ret onto a set
of resources. Formally, assigned re(ret)={re∈Re|(re, ret)∈RTA}.
2.3 Integration of Service Provision and Service Realization
Service provision and service realization in SOAC must be worked together for
authorization of composite web services. In Fig. 2, the mappings between the
elements of Role (R), Operation (Op), and Recourse Type (ReT) integrate the
service provision and service realization. The access to the composite web service
can be assigned to a service consumer if all the constraints of the composite
web service and its resources can be satisfied. In service provision, the service
consumer is assigned a specific role for the access to the operations; while in
service realization, the operations are mapped with resource types that cover all
resources required.
In order to check conflict of interest at runtime, element Session is intro-
duced at integration of service provision and service realization in SOAC (see
Fig. 2). There are two types of sessions, Independent session (ISe) and Com-
pound session (CSe). ISe is used to check runtime conflict of interest in service
provision; while CSe is used to check runtime conflict of interest at integra-
tion of service provision and service realization. After a service consumer starts
to send message to the composite web service for accessing its operations, the
service consumer activates the assigned specific roles in an independent session.
The resource types are involved when resources are required in composite web
services. A compound session is established when the message from service con-
sumer is transferred to resource. In this case, specific resource type is activated
by the resource as well as the role is activated by the service consumer in a
compound session. Note, the resource type and associated resources can not be
included in the independent session, since a composite web service can not use
the resource type without receiving the authorization request from the service
consumer. Below is the formal definition of Session.
Definition 3. Session includes two types, Independent Session (ISe) and
Compound Session (CSe).
– Independent Session (ISe) is used by service consumer sc to map the set
of activated roles {r1..rj}, j≥1.
– Compound Session (CSe) is used by a pair of service consumer and
resource < sc, re > to map a set of activated roles and resource types {< r1,
ret1 >..< rj, retk >}, (Note, the operations that the service consumer sc
requires to access are the same operations that the resource re can provide
support to.) where:
◦ r1..rj, j≥1, is a subset of roles assigned to and activated by the specific
service consumer sc.
◦ ret1..retk, k≥1 is a subset of resource type assigned and activated by the
specific resource.
– Service Consumer Independent Session: SCSi:(sc:SC)→2ISe, the
mapping of service consumer sc onto a set of independent sessions ISe.
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– Service Consumer Compound Session: SCSc : (sc : SC)→ 2CSe, the
mapping of service consumer sc onto a set of compound sessions CSe.
– Role Independent Session: RSi:(sei:ISe)→ 2R, the mapping of inde-
pendent session sei onto a set of roles.
– Role Compound Session: RSc : (sec : CSe) → 2R, the mapping of com-
pound session sec onto a set of roles.
– Resource Session: RES(re:Re)→2CSe, the mapping of resource re onto a
set of compound session CSe.
– Resource Type Session:RTS(sec:CSe) →2ReT , the mapping of compound
session sec onto a set of resource types.
3 Management of Conflict of Interest
Four types of Conflicts of Interest are identified based on SOAC. Authoriza-
tion rules are defined to prevent the various types of conflict of interest at both
design time and run time.
The relationships between two elements with the same type in SOAC are
defined as Exclusive ⊗ or Non-exclusive 
. Exclusive relationship means that two
elements of SOAC, e.g., two service consumers, two roles, or two operations, are
ostracized each other; while Non-exclusive relationship means that two elements
of SOAC are not ostracized each other. The relationship between elements with
the same type in different authorizations should be the same; Otherwise, conflict
of interest will occur.
3.1 Conflict of Interest between Service Consumers
In service provision, the relationship between two service consumers should be
the same as the relationship between the assigned roles for these two consumers
to prevent conflict of interest. In Fig. 3, if Opa and Opb are exclusive (Opa⊗Opb),
then the relationship between Ri and Rj that are mapped to the operations Opa
and Opb respectively should reflect the exclusive relationship (Opa ⊗Opb⇒Ri ⊗
Rj). The relationship between assigned roles for service consumers SCn and SCm
must be matched with the relationship between these two consumers. If service
consumers SCn and SCm are non-exclusive with each other (SCn 
SCm), then
SCn and SCm can not be assigned roles Ri and Rj respectively at the same
time because the roles have the exclusive relationship.
Two special cases are illustrated in Fig. 3, where (1) two service consumers
become the same one in special case A, and (2) two operations become the same
one in special case B. Moreover, the relationship between the element and itself
can be non-exclusive or exclusive according to its situation.
For example, Payment and Payment Verification are exclusive operations
that need to be mapped to different roles, and such roles are recognized as
exclusive roles as Payer and Verifier. If a service consumer is assigned with
both Payer and Verifier (Special case A in Fig.3), the conflict of interest will
occur, since Payer and Verifier must have relationship-Exclusive for access
exclusive operations.
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Fig. 3. Role Relationship Check (R-RC)
Let us take another example. ”Double Check” policy is enforced in Tom
& Brothers on operation of Payment Verification, i.e., two financial institutes
are required to ensure the payment from purchaser. In order to avoid fraud-
ulent payment assessment on purchase, an exclusive relationship between the
Initial Verifier and Second Verifier must be enforced. Westpac Financial
Service and St. George Financial Consultant Company are two financial insti-
tutes with non-exclusive relationship because they belong to the same financial
group. Westpac Financial Service and St. George Financial Consultant Company
can not be assigned the roles Initial Verifier and Second Verifier to do
payment verification for one transaction due to their non-exclusive relationship.
To prevent conflict of interest among service consumers, the following autho-
rization rule named as Static Role Relationship Check (S-R-RC) is specified as
follows:
Authorization Rule 1. S-R-RC: Let SC be a set of Service Consumers. Let
R be a set of Roles. We say that, there is no conflict of interest between service
consumers, formally ∃ri ∈ R, ∃scm ∈ SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, if there exists a subset
of Role R named as ˜Ra, which includes all roles that have been mapped with
service consumers, and the relationships between ri and roles in ˜Ra are the same
as the relationships between scm and service consumers that have been mapped to
the roles in ˜Ra. Formally, ∃˜Ra ⊆ R-{ri}, ∀ rj ∈ ˜Ra, (rj , assigned sc(rj)) ∈ SCA,
∀r′j ∈ R-{ri}-˜Ra, assigned sc(r′j) = ∅, RL(ri, rj) = RL(scm, assigned sc(rj)),
where RL(element, element)={⊗, 
} reflecting the exclusive, or non-exclusive
relationships between elements.
As an alternative solution, roles can be assigned without using the above au-
thorization rule but the conflict of authorization between consumers will be
checked at run time. The mapping between service consumers and roles can be
stored in the system at design time. The conflict of interest between consumers
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are checked when the assigned roles are activated simultaneously by a specific
consumer. The authorization rule named as Dynamic Role Relationship Check
(D-R-RC) is specified as follows:
Authorization Rule 2. D-R-RC: Let SC be a set of Service Consumers. Let
R be a set of Roles. We say that, there is no runtime conflict of interest between
service consumers, formally ∃ri ∈ R, ∃scm ∈ SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, and ri ∈
RSi(SCSi(scm)) and/or ri ∈ RSc(SCSc(scm)), if there exists a subset of Role
R named as ˜Rb, which includes all roles that are being activated; the relationships
between ri and all roles in ˜Rb are the same as the relationships between scm and
service consumers that are activating these roles in ˜Rb. Formally, ∃˜Rb ⊆ R-{ri},
∀rk ∈ ˜Rb, ∃scn ∈ SC, rk ∈ RSi(SCSi(scn)) and/or rk ∈ RSc(SCSc(scn)),
∀r′k ∈ R-˜Rb-ri, ∀sc′n ∈ SC, r′k /∈ RSi(SCSi(sc′n)), and r′k /∈ RSc(SCSc(sc′n)),
RL(ri, rk) = RL(scm, scn).
3.2 Conflict of Interest between Resources
If two resources have the relationship Exclusive or Non-exclusive, the mapped re-
source types for these two resources must have the same relationship as exclusive
or non-exclusive to prevent conflict of interest.
In Fig.4, if Opa and Opb have exclusive relationship (Opa ⊗ Opb), then the
relevant resource type ReTi and ReTj should be exclusive (Opa⊗Opb ⇒ ReTi⊗
RetTj). The relationship between the resource types mapped with resources Rek
and Reh must be the same as the relationship between these two resources. If
the resources Rek and Reh are non-exclusive with each other (Rek 
Reh), e.g.,
belonging to one company group, then Rek and Reh can not be mapped to
resource type ReTi and ReTj respectively at the same time, since ReTi and
ReTj are exclusive. To avoid conflict of interest, two resources with relationship
⊗ or 
 must be included in the associated two resource types with the same
relationship ⊗ or 
.
Two special cases are described in Fig.4, where operations (Special Case A
in Fig.4) and resources (Special Case B in Fig.4) become one operation and one
resource respectively. Let us take an example as special case B in Fig. 4. For the
security reason, Order Engine and Order Engine Accessory are exclusive opera-
tions in Tom & Brothers (particularly for military customer), where the mapped
resource type, Engine Supplier and Engine Accessory Supplier, are exclu-
sive. Hence, if the resource mapped to Engine Supplier and Engine Accessory
Supplier are the same one, non-exclusive relationship exists between the re-
source and itself, and the resource can not be included in resource type Engine
Supplier and Engine Accessory Supplier at the same time.
We devise the authorization rule named as Static Resource Type Relationship
Check (S-RT-RC) on the mapping of resources and resource types to prevent
the conflict of interest between resources. Here we formally define the authoriza-
tion rule at design time as follows:
Authorization Rule 3. S-RT-RC: Let Re be a set of Resources. Let ReT be
a set of Resource Types. We say that, there is no conflict of interest between
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Fig. 4. Resource Type Relationship Check (RT-RC)
resources, formally ∃reti ∈ ReT, ∃reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈ RTA, if there exists
a subset of ReT named as R̃eTa that includes all resource types that have been
mapped with resources, and the relationships between reti and resource types in
R̃eTa are the same as the relationships between reh and the resources mapped
with resource types in R̃eTa. Formally ∃R̃eTa ⊆ ReT-{reti}, ∀ retj ∈ R̃eTa,
(retj , assigned re(retj)) ∈ RTA, ∀ret′j ∈ ReT-{reti}-R̃eTa, assigned re(ret′j) =
∅, RL(reti, retj) = RL(reh, assigned re(retj)).
Alternatively, the resource can be mapped to resource types without using the
above authorization rule, but the conflict of interest between resources will be
checked at run time. The mapping between resources and resource types can
be stored in system at design time. The conflict of interest between resources
are checked when the resource types are activated simultaneously by employing
the resources to provide support to the operations. Here we formally define the
Dynamic Resource Type Relationship Check (D-RT-RC) on preventing runtime
conflict of interest between resources.
Authorization Rule 4. D-RT-RC: Let Re be a set of Resources. Let ReT be
a set of Resource Types. We say that, there is no runtime conflict of interest be-
tween resources, formally ∃reti ∈ ReT, ∃reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈ RTA, and reti ∈
RTS(RES(reh)), if there exists a subset of ReT named as R̃eTb includes all re-
source types that are being activated; The relationships between reti and resource
types in R̃eTb should be the same as the relationships between reh and resources
that are employed to support operations by specific resource types in R̃eTb. For-
mally, ∃R̃eTb ⊆ ReT-{reti}, ∀retk ∈ R̃eTb, ∃rel ∈ Re, retk ∈RTS(RES(rel)),
∀ret′k ∈ ReT-R̃eTb-{reti}, ∀re′l ∈ Re, ret′k /∈ RTS(RES(re′l)), RL(reti, retk) =
RL(reh, rel).
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3.3 Conflict of Interest between Service Consumers and Resources
Resources and service consumers can have relationship as exclusive or non-
exclusive that must be the same as the relationship of mapped roles and resource
types. The relationship between a resource type and a role reflects the relation-
ship between the operation that the role need to access and the operation that
the resource type can support. The conflict of interest between service consumers
and resources can occur, if the relationship between the service consumers and
the resources is not the same as the relationship of mapped role and resource
type.
Two special case are also presented in Fig. 5, where (1) the operation that
the role need to access and the operation that the resource type can support are
the same one (Special Case A in Fig. 5), and (2) the service consumer and the
resource are the same web service (Special Case B in Fig. 5). In special case A at
Fig. 5, the operation that the resource type ReTj supports is what the role Rj
need to access (Opa = Opb). Their relationship is non-exclusive (Opa 
 Opb). If
the relationship between the mapped service consumer SCm and resource Rek
is exclusive (SCm ⊗Rek), e.g., the Chinese manufactory as the resource and the
USA military customer as the service consumer, the mapping between the service
consumer SCm to the specific role Rj and the mapping between the resource
Rek to the specific resource type ReTj can not be made simultaneously.
Let us take another example, in special case B at Fig. 5, a service consumer
and a resource belong to one web service (SCm = Rek). Their relationship is
non-exclusive (SCm 
 Rek). If the operation that the web service supports as
resource is exclusive with the operation that the web service need to access as
the service consumer (Opa ⊗ Opb), there is a conflict of interest between the
consumer and the resource. If the web service is assigned with specific role Ri
to access the operation Opa, it can not be mapped to resource type ReTj to
support operation Opb; vise versa.
Fig. 5. Role & Resource Type Relationship Check (RRT-RC)
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We define authorization rule named as Static Role & Resource Type Relation-
ship Check (S-RRT-RC) to prevent the conflict of interest between the consumer
and the resource. The formal specification is as follows:
Authorization Rule 5. S-RRT-RC: Let Re be a set of Resources, and SC be
a set of Service Consumers. Let R be a set of Roles, and ReT be a set of Resource
Types. We say that, there is no conflict of interest between service consumer and
resource if (1) and (2) are satisfied:
1. service consumer scm and role ri can be mapped in SCA, formally ∃ri ∈
R, ∃scm ∈ SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, if there exists a set named as R̃eTa that is
a subset of Resource Types and includes all resource types that have been
mapped with specific resources; The relationships between ri and resource
types in R̃eTa should be the same as the relationships between scm and the re-
sources that are mapped with the resource types in R̃eTa. Formally, ∃R̃eTa ⊆
ReT, ∀ retj ∈ R̃eTa, (retj, assigned re(retj)) ∈ RTA, ∀ret′j ∈ ReT − R̃eTa,
assigned re(ret′j) = ∅, RL(retj , ri) = RL(assigned re(retj), scm).
2. resource type reti and resource reh can be mapped in RTA, formally ∃reti ∈
ReT, ∃reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈ RTA, if there exists a set Ra as a subset of
Roles that includes all roles which have been assigned to specific service con-
sumers, and the relationships between reti and all roles in Ra should be
the same as the relationship between reh and service consumers that are
assigned as specific roles in Ra. Formally, ∃˜Ra ⊆ R, ∀ rj ∈ ˜Ra, (rj , as-
signed sc(rj)) ∈ SCA, ∀r′j ∈ R − ˜Ra, assigned sc(r′j) = ∅, RL(reti, rj) =
RL(reh, assigned sc(rj)).
The mappings between roles and service consumers, and the mappings between
resources and resource types can be made without using the above authoriza-
tion rule. The conflict of interest between service consumers and resources will
be checked at runtime. The mappings between role and service consumer, and
the mapping between resource and resource type can be stored in system at
design time. The conflict of interest between service consumer and resource is
checked when the assigned role and resource type are activated simultaneously
in the execution of the composite web service requested by the specific service
consumer. The authorization rule named as Dynamic Role & Resource Type
Relationship Check (D-RRT-RC) is specifies as follows:
Authorization Rule 6. D-RRT-RC Let Re be a set of Resources, and SC
be a set of Service Consumers. Let R be a set of Roles, and ReT be a set of
Resource Types. We say that, there is no runtime conflict of interest between
service consumer and resource if (1) and (2) are satisfied:
1. service consumer scm can activate assigned role ri, formally ∃ri ∈ R, ∃scm ∈
SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, and ri ∈ RSc(SCSc(scm)), if there exists a subset of
Resource Types named as R̃eTb that includes all resource types that are acti-
vated (when resources mapped to these resource types are required to provide
support to operations); the relationship between ri and all resource types
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in R̃eTb should be the same as the relationship between scm and resources
that are activating the resource types in R̃eTb. Formally, ∃R̃eTb ⊆ ReT,
∀retg ∈ R̃eTb, ∃reh ∈ Re, retg ∈ RTS(RES(reh)), ∀ret′g ∈ ReT − R̃eTb,
∀re′h ∈ Re, ret′g /∈ RTS(RES(re′h)), RL(retg, ri) = RL(reh, scm).
2. resource type reti is being activated by resource reh, formally ∃reti ∈ ReT,
∃ reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈ RTA, and reti ∈ RTS(RES(reh)), if there exists a
subset of R named as ˜Rb that includes all of roles that have been activated;
The relationship between reti and roles in ˜Rb should be the same as the
relationship between reh and service consumers that activate the roles in ˜Rb.
Formally, ∃˜Rb ⊆ R, ∀rg ∈ ˜Rb, ∃scm ∈ SC, rg ∈ RSc(SCSc(scm)), ∀r′g ∈ R-
˜Rb, ∀sc′m ∈ SC, r′g /∈ RSc(SCSc(sc′m)), RL(reti, rg) = RL(reh, scm).
Conflict of interest between one pair of service consumer/resource and other
pairs of service consumer/resource is another new type of conflict of interest
which can be identified in SOAC. A service consumer and a resource is put
in one pair when the service consumer request the access of the operation of
a composite web service and the operation needs the support of the resource.
The relationships between pairs of role/resource type reflect the relationships
between operations mapped to these pairs of role/resource type. If two pairs of
service consumer/resource have the relationship Exclusive or Non-exclusive, the
pairs of mapped roles and resource types must have the same relationship as
Exclusive or Non-exclusive
For example, in Fig. 6, if the operations are exclusive (Opa ⊗ Opb), the re-
lationship between the pairs of mapped roles and resource types must also be
exclusive (Opa ⊗ Opb ⇒ (Ri, ReTi) ⊗ (Rj , ReTj)). Note, here the relationship
between operations will be reflected by the relationship between the pairs of roles
and resource types rather than considering the relationship between roles or re-
sources types individually which are discussed in previous subsections 3.1 and
3.2. If the relationship between two pairs of service consumer and resource are
non-exclusive ((SCnReh)
 (SCm, Rek)), the pairs of mapped roles and resource
types must also be non-exclusive to prevent the conflict of interest.
Two special cases are illustrated in Fig. 6, where (1) the pairs of service con-
sumer and resource are the same one (Special case A in Fig. 6 (SCm = SCn
and Reh = Rek)), and (2) the operations in different authorizations are the
same one (Special cased B in Fig. 6 (Opa = Opb)). Let us take an example
in special case A. When a service consumer is mapped with the role Military
Customer by Tom & Brothers, and the goods it orders need to be supplied
by part manufactory mapped with resource type Vehicle Engine Supplier,
it will violate the law if Tom & Brothers also use the same manufactory that
is mapped with resource type Vehicle Engine Accessory Supplier to supply
the engine accessory to the same consumer that is mapped with role Commercial
Customer. In this case, the exclusive relationship between operations of Or-
der Engine and Order Engine Accessory requires that the relationship between
the pair of Military Customer and Vehicle Engine Supplier and the pair of
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Fig. 6. Pairs of Role & Resource Type Relationship Check (PRRT-RC)
Commercial Customer and Vehicle Engine Accessory Supplier are exclu-
sive also. If the two pairs of role and resource type are mapped to the same
pair of service consumer and resource with a non-exclusive relationship, the
conflict of interest occurs. This conflict of interest is identified to prevent the
following two things happening at the same time. The first thing is to assem-
ble the engine for military use with the engine accessory for civil use and the
second thing is to purchase engine and engine accessory from the same part
suppliers. We can observe that the service consumer can be mapped with both
roles Military Customer and Commercial Customer without causing conflict
of interest between customers (discussed in subsection 3.1). We can also ob-
serve that the manufactory can be mapped with both resource types Vehicle
Engine Supplier and Vehicle Engine Accessory Supplier without causing
conflict of interest between resources (discussed in subsection 3.2). The conflict
of interest occurs when the service consumer is mapped with both roles and the
resource is mapped with both resource types. In a summary, if the manufac-
tory as Vehicle Engine Supplier to provide engine to a service consumer as
Military Customer, it should not provide engine accessory to the same service
consumer that is identified as Commercial Customer; vise versa.
We set up authorization rule named as Static Pairs of Role & Resource Type
Relationship Check (S-PRRT-RC) to prevent conflict of interest between two
pairs of service consumer/resource. Here we formally define the authorization
rule at design time as follows:
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Authorization Rule 7. S-PRRT-RC Let Re be a set of Resources, and SC
be a set of Service Consumers. Let R be a set of Roles, and ReT be a set of Re-
source Types. We say that, there is no conflict of interest between one pair of ser-
vice consumer/resource and another pair of service consumer/resource, formally
∃ri ∈ R, ∃scm ∈ SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, ∃reti ∈ ReT, ∃reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈
RTA, assigned op(ri)∩ assigned ret(reti) = ∅, if there exists a set named as
R̃eTa that is a subset of Resource Types and includes all resource types which
have been mapped with specific resources, and exists a set named as ˜Ra that
is a subset of Roles and includes all roles which have been assigned to spe-
cific service consumers; There must exist a resource type (retk) and a role
(rk) that map to the same operations; the relationship between (reti, ri) and
(retk, rk) should be the same as the relationships between (reh, scm) and pairs of
resources and service consumers that are mapped to retk and rk respectively.
Formally, ∃R̃eTa ⊆ ReT, ∀ retj ∈ R̃eTa, (retj , assigned re(retj)) ∈ RTA,
∀ret′j ∈ ReT − R̃eTa, assigned re(ret′j) = ∅, ∃˜Ra ⊆ R, ∀ rj ∈ ˜Ra, (rj , as-
signed sc(rj)) ∈ SCA, ∀r′j ∈ R − ˜Ra, assigned sc(r′j) = ∅, ∃rk ∈ ˜Ra, ∃retk ∈
R̃eTa, assigned op(rk) ∩ assigned ret(retk) = ∅, RL((reti, ri), (retk, rk)) = RL
((reh, scm), (assigned re(retk), assigned sc(rk))).
Without using the above authorization rule, the conflict of interest between
pairs of service consumer and resource can be checked at runtime. The mapping
between service consumer and role, and the mapping between resource type and
resource are stored in system. The conflict of interest between pairs of service
consumer/resource is checked when the associated roles and resource types are
activated simultaneously. The authorization rule named as Dynamic Pairs of
Role & Resource Type Relationship Check (D-PRRT-RC) is specified as follows:
Authorization Rule 8. D-PRRT-RC Let Re be a set of Resources, and
SC be a set of Service Consumers. Let R be a set of Roles, and ReT be a
set of Resource Types. We say that, there is no runtime conflict of inter-
est between one pair of service consumer/resource and another pair of service
consumer/resource, formally ∃ri ∈ R, ∃scm ∈ SC, (ri, scm) ∈ SCA, ∃reti ∈
ReT, ∃reh ∈ Re, (reh, reti) ∈ RTA, assigned op(ri) ∩ assigned ret(reti) = ∅,
ri ∈ RSc (SCSc(scm)), and reti ∈ RTS(RES(reh)), if there exists a subset
of ReT named as R̃eTb which includes all resource types that are being ac-
tivated, and there also exists a subset of R named as ˜Rb which includes all
roles that are being activated. There must exists a resource type retk belong-
ing to R̃eTb and a role rk belonging to ˜Rb that are supporting and access-
ing the same operations respectively; The relationship between (reti, ri) and
(retk, rk) should be the same as the relationship between (reh, scm) and pairs
of resources and service consumers that are activating retk and rk respectively.
Formally ∃R̃eTb ⊆ ReT, ∀retx ∈ R̃eTb, ∃rey ∈ Re, retx ∈ RTS(RES(rey)),
∀ret′x ∈ ReT − R̃eTb, ∀re′y ∈ Re, ret′x /∈ RTS(RES(re′y)), ∃˜Rb ⊆ R,
∀rx ∈ ˜Rb, ∃scy ∈ SC, rx ∈ RSc(SCSc(scy)), ∀r′x ∈ ˜Rb, ∀sc′y ∈ SC, r′x /∈
RSc(SCSc(sc′y)), ∃rk ∈ ˜Rb,∃retk ∈ R̃eTb, assigned op(rk) ∩ assigned ret(retk)
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= ∅, ∃scn ∈ SC, rk ∈ RSc(SCSc(scn)), ∃reg ∈ Re, retk ∈ RTS(RES(reg)),
RL((reti, ri), (retk, rk)) = RL((reh, scm), (reg, scn)).
4 Related Work
Role based access control [2, 3] is a widely accepted approach to restrict sys-
tem access to authorized users. In RBAC, users acquire permissions through
their roles rather than they are assigned permissions directly. Traditional RBAC
models deal with authorization of resources which belong to an individual or-
ganization. In web service paradigm, the component services of composite web
services and their related resources normally spread over multiple organizations
and are invoked in a highly dynamic manner. Traditional RBAC models can
not be used directly as ready solutions for authorization of web services. There
have been quite a lot of researches about authorization of web services. We will
overview some representative work in the follows.
In [5, 6], the authors propose a RBAC framework to manage access control
in WS-BPEL [7], named RBAC-WS-BPEL. In RBAC-WS-BPEL, authorization
constrains are specified on the execution activities and roles are assigned to users
for gaining permissions on execution activities. This research only focuses on the
service orchestration level and it has no capability to consider characteristics of
resources required by composite web services.
In [8, 9], the authors provide an enforcement and verification approach to
guarantee that a service choreography can be successfully implemented between
a set of web services (service consumer and the composite web service) based
on their authorization constraints. This research only focuses on enforcement
and verification of authorization between service consumer and composite web
service. The component web services in authorization of composite web service
are not taken into account.
An access control model CWS-RBAC was proposed in [10] which takes the
composite service into consideration and is comparable to our proposed ap-
proach. In CWS-RBAC, a global role is assigned to service consumers to gain the
permission to access the composite service and a local role mapped from global
role is assigned to service consumer to access the other component services. The
authors in [11] propose another concept-Role Composition where global role and
local role are composed together. It analyzes how a local role issued by an indi-
vidual component service is mapped to a global role from the composite services.
In that case, if the service consumer is assigned with a global role, then it auto-
matically bears the permissions of the bound local role on the component service.
In these approaches, the ”role” as a concept used by a specific service to manage
the authorization is part of internal security policy within an individual web ser-
vice and can not be identified by other services. For example, the composite web
service can not identify which role that it can be assigned by the component web
service that it needs to access. Actually, the composite web service can only per-
ceive the permissions based on credentials, i.e, the authorization constraints (the
public part of authorization policy of each web service). Hence, the mapping of
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the global role issued from the composite service with the local role generated in
other component services is not realistic. In our proposed approach, we introduce
the resource type (ReT) to explicitly express characteristics and requirements of
resources associated with component services. ReT can support an efficient way
for the management of dynamically involved and prone-to-change component
services in composite web services. Furthermore, ReT provides the fundamental
concept for defining the conflict of interest related with component services.
Conflict of interest is a major concern in traditional RBAC models. In order to
deal with conflict of interest, static and dynamic separation of duty mechanisms
are defined in RBAC standard [12, 14]. The authors in [13] have discussed the
conflict of interest in the authorization of web services. However, this research
deals with the authorization of web services using the same way as those autho-
rizations in close systems. In particular, the features of composite web services
have not been taken into consideration. It is lacking of existing work to identify
and deal with possible types of conflict of interest among service consumers,
among component services, and between service consumers and component ser-
vices in composite web services.
Existing approaches about authorization of composite web services have the
limitations: (1) ignoring the dynamic nature of composite web services that re-
quire resources based on-demand; (2) missing an efficient way to the administra-
tion of the resources in service-oriented authorization; (3) hard coding the roles
issued from resources and composite service; and (4) lacking of authorization
rules for preventing conflict of interest in composite web service authorization.
This paper reports our research for the authorization of composite web services
to address the above mentioned limitations of existing approaches.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed approach for authorization of composite web services can provide
an efficient way to administrate and manage a large number of service consumers
and dynamic component services. This research addresses the conflict of interest
issue regarding to both service consumers and component services in composite
web services. Four types of conflict of interest are identified. Authorization rules
at both design time and run time to deal with various types of conflict of interest
are provided and illustrated. In the future, we plan to investigate the possibil-
ity of employing the hierarchical structure to represent resource types and the
mechanism of mapping between resource types and individual resources.
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